WHAT
PARTIES AREN’T
We’ve said it before, but it bears repeating: Political parties are not ideological vessels, but rather competitive organizations.
The Democratic Party does not exist to be liberal or even to see liberal policies enacted. It exists to help its members win elections. And neither does the Republican Party exist for the sake of conservatism, but rather for beating Democrats.
Think of it this way: McDonald’s doesn’t exist to make hamburgers; it exits to make money for its shareholders. If the company could make more money selling its surprisingly not-terrible pizza or damnably delicious rib-shaped patties of ground meat or even, saints preserve us, lobster, it would focus on those things. But it can’t, so it doesn’t.
What makes parties different, of course, is that they are rather like employee-owned enterprises. And most of the employees are volunteers.
You can’t win the election without first attracting your core group, and since the field at hand is government, the point of attraction tends to be ideological. That’s become truer with the substantial breakdown of regional and white ethnic party loyalty and the rise of the independents.
Republicans mostly found their winning brand for the past two generations was conservatism as defined by the concepts of limited government, “traditional” values and a muscular foreign policy. The party would attract core support on these arguments and then try to repurpose the ideas for a more ideologically diverse general electorate.
The primaries were all red meat and then in the general, campaigns suddenly tried to turn it into McLobster. Results, let’s just say, varied.
After the defeats there were, invariably, two solutions proffered, and both were ideological. Conservatives called for a rightward turn toward purity while moderates said it was time to curb conservatism and steer toward the center.
These ideas always misunderstood two things. First, a party’s ideology is not a function of central planning. It bubbles up from local and state elections and officeholders. There is no dial on the wall at the RNC. Second, ideology matters much less in general elections than people believe.
Americans will elect very liberal people, they will elect very conservative people, but they always elect people.
President Obama didn’t beat Mitt Romney because Romney was too conservative or not conservative enough. Obama beat Romney because voters liked and trusted Obama more. The same was true in 2004 with George W. Bush and John Kerry. Voters have wisely learned to ignore most of what politicians say and instead focus on them as individuals.
Watching Ted Cruz’s candidacy melt like a Slush Puppie on a hot radiator is perhaps the best proof of all. No candidate in the GOP race had a platform more carefully crafted to appeal to the broadest spectrum of the party’s conservative base. And yet, the voters he was counting on went for the guy who defends Planned Parenthood.
Back before social media turned political discourse into the rhetorical equivalent of standing next to a speaker tower at a Fugazi concert, RINO (Republican in Name Only) was a preferred epithet from conservatives for moderate Republicans. But it’s not accurate.
Republicanism doesn’t equal conservatism. It wasn’t like Gov. John Kasich, the moderate ideological Slush Puppie of 2016, is less of a Republican than Cruz or the rest of the field. He is just less conservative.
The big question now is what happens when someone who is neither a conservative – at least in the traditional sense of the past 60 years – nor a Republican loyalist takes over the party.
So far, Trump is not shy about bucking conservatives on subjects like trade, increasing the minimum wage, foreign policy and tax rates. But he’s also doing what his nominee predecessors have done before: invoking the process and party loyalty.
“Well, I understand Jeb Bush. I was rough with Jeb Bush. And I think if I was Jeb Bush, I wouldn’t vote for me either, if you want to know the truth…” Trump said Sunday on ABC News. “But, you know, they should do that. They’re Republicans.”
In that last sentence, Trump shows a better grasp of the process than most. Bush and others didn’t sign on to the Conservative Party or the Polite Party or the Qualifications Party. “They’re Republicans,” as Trump said. And Trump just ate their party, like the last morsel of a McRib.
Paul Ryan and others can fight all they want, but they’re not selling hamburgers anymore.
The question now for Trump is whether he can succeed with his personality and the party’s new populist product. Whether conservatives ever get their party back, and maybe even whether the GOP can stay in business, will depend on the answer.
We’ve said it before, but it bears repeating: Political parties are not ideological vessels, but rather competitive organizations.
The Democratic Party does not exist to be liberal or even to see liberal policies enacted. It exists to help its members win elections. And neither does the Republican Party exist for the sake of conservatism, but rather for beating Democrats.
Think of it this way: McDonald’s doesn’t exist to make hamburgers; it exits to make money for its shareholders. If the company could make more money selling its surprisingly not-terrible pizza or damnably delicious rib-shaped patties of ground meat or even, saints preserve us, lobster, it would focus on those things. But it can’t, so it doesn’t.
What makes parties different, of course, is that they are rather like employee-owned enterprises. And most of the employees are volunteers.
You can’t win the election without first attracting your core group, and since the field at hand is government, the point of attraction tends to be ideological. That’s become truer with the substantial breakdown of regional and white ethnic party loyalty and the rise of the independents.
Republicans mostly found their winning brand for the past two generations was conservatism as defined by the concepts of limited government, “traditional” values and a muscular foreign policy. The party would attract core support on these arguments and then try to repurpose the ideas for a more ideologically diverse general electorate.
The primaries were all red meat and then in the general, campaigns suddenly tried to turn it into McLobster. Results, let’s just say, varied.
After the defeats there were, invariably, two solutions proffered, and both were ideological. Conservatives called for a rightward turn toward purity while moderates said it was time to curb conservatism and steer toward the center.
These ideas always misunderstood two things. First, a party’s ideology is not a function of central planning. It bubbles up from local and state elections and officeholders. There is no dial on the wall at the RNC. Second, ideology matters much less in general elections than people believe.
Americans will elect very liberal people, they will elect very conservative people, but they always elect people.
President Obama didn’t beat Mitt Romney because Romney was too conservative or not conservative enough. Obama beat Romney because voters liked and trusted Obama more. The same was true in 2004 with George W. Bush and John Kerry. Voters have wisely learned to ignore most of what politicians say and instead focus on them as individuals.
Watching Ted Cruz’s candidacy melt like a Slush Puppie on a hot radiator is perhaps the best proof of all. No candidate in the GOP race had a platform more carefully crafted to appeal to the broadest spectrum of the party’s conservative base. And yet, the voters he was counting on went for the guy who defends Planned Parenthood.
Back before social media turned political discourse into the rhetorical equivalent of standing next to a speaker tower at a Fugazi concert, RINO (Republican in Name Only) was a preferred epithet from conservatives for moderate Republicans. But it’s not accurate.
Republicanism doesn’t equal conservatism. It wasn’t like Gov. John Kasich, the moderate ideological Slush Puppie of 2016, is less of a Republican than Cruz or the rest of the field. He is just less conservative.
The big question now is what happens when someone who is neither a conservative – at least in the traditional sense of the past 60 years – nor a Republican loyalist takes over the party.
So far, Trump is not shy about bucking conservatives on subjects like trade, increasing the minimum wage, foreign policy and tax rates. But he’s also doing what his nominee predecessors have done before: invoking the process and party loyalty.
“Well, I understand Jeb Bush. I was rough with Jeb Bush. And I think if I was Jeb Bush, I wouldn’t vote for me either, if you want to know the truth…” Trump said Sunday on ABC News. “But, you know, they should do that. They’re Republicans.”
In that last sentence, Trump shows a better grasp of the process than most. Bush and others didn’t sign on to the Conservative Party or the Polite Party or the Qualifications Party. “They’re Republicans,” as Trump said. And Trump just ate their party, like the last morsel of a McRib.
Paul Ryan and others can fight all they want, but they’re not selling hamburgers anymore.
The question now for Trump is whether he can succeed with his personality and the party’s new populist product. Whether conservatives ever get their party back, and maybe even whether the GOP can stay in business, will depend on the answer.
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