Too Bad We Stopped Taking The Constitution Seriously: Delegation Of Powers
By George Leef
Do you think you would like living in
a country where the ruler or his minions could declare what the law was, change
it at will, and decide whether someone was guilty of a violation?
Certainly not. People risk their lives
to escape from such places, North Korea and Cuba, for instance.
Long ago, Englishmen began to rebel
against such government – rule by royal prerogative –
beginning in 1215 with Magna Carta, which kept the King from arresting and
punishing subjects except in accordance with established legal procedures.
Later, English judges would rule that the King could not govern through royal
proclamations, and in 1641 Parliament abolished King Charles’ Star Chamber and
High Commission, key tools in his heavy-handed reign.
The rule of law – known, fair, and
stable – was replacing royal prerogative and the people were far better off for
it.
In America, the grievances of the
colonists were grounded in the vestiges of royal prerogative. After winning
independence, the people wanted to make sure that they would not suffer anything like
it. As Columbia University law professor Philip Hamburger explains in a
recent talk (available in the September 2014 Hillsdale College
Imprimis), “Early Americans were very familiar with absolute power. They
feared this extra-legal, supra-legal, and consolidated power because they knew
from English history that such power could evade the law and override all legal
rights.”
Those concerns gave rise to the
Constitution’s separation of powers.
Article One, Section One provides
that all legislative powers vest in Congress. Neither the
executive nor the judicial branches are to create law. Each branch is to stay within its
narrowly and precisely prescribed functions to guard against encroachments on
the people’s liberty.
It worked – for a while.
During the so-called Progressive Era (better
called the Big Government Must Solve All Our Problems Era), Congress
began establishing administrative agencies charged with implementing statutes
it passed, the Interstate Commerce Commission, for example. That was
constitutionally permissible, but before long, Congress sought to give
such agencies legislative powers – to make law through regulations. The
Supreme Court ruled that unconstitutional because Congress was not empowered to delegate
its legislative power to any other body.
Thus was born the non-delegation
doctrine, and it held through 1936. Numerous New Deal statutes foundered upon
it. But in 1937, the Supreme Court chose to ignore it in the pivotal case
of NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel. In passing the National
Labor Relations Act, Congress had put de facto legislative power over labor
relations in the hands of a bureaucratic agency, the National Labor Relations Board.
The
Court did not overrule the earlier cases (such as Carter v. Carter Coal in 1936), but gave the NLRB the green
light. Ever since, it has turned a blind eye to the increasing delegation of
legislative power to unelected bureaucrats.
Along with most of America, the
Court’s justices have blithely accepted the idea that Congress simply cannot write
all the laws needed today because our problems have become “too complex.” Under
that notion, the best (and constitutionally unobjectionable) course
for Congress is to enact vague, general statutes that leave it to supposed experts in administrative agencies to figure
out all the details and enforce them. Thus, our enormous body of administrative
law is just a matter of necessity – or so the argument goes.
Professor Hamburger is not persuaded.
“Administrative law is commonly defended as a new sort of power, a product of
the 19th and 20th centuries that developed to deal with the problems
of modern society in all its complexity. From this perspective, the Framers of
the Constitution could not have anticipated it and the Constitution could not
have barred it,“ he writes in the essay above.
He continues, “What I suggest,
however, is that administrative power is actually very old. It revives
prerogative or absolute power and thus it is something the Constitution
centrally prohibited.” In his recent book, Is
Administrative Law Unlawful? he fully presents his argument
against the constitutionality of lawmaking through administrative edict.
I think Professor Hamburger is right
on the constitutional question, but I’d also say that, quite apart from its
constitutional defects, administrative law is a bad development for America. In
many, many aspects of life, we now face thick piles of administrative
regulations. Knowing and comprehending them is a virtual impossibility. We
would be far better off without them, our conduct instead governed by the
simplicity of common law.
Labor relations, for example, is
covered by a heavy blanket of administrative rules and decisions of the
National Labor Relations Board, but labor relations are no more “complex” now
than they were prior to the creation of that agency in the NLRA. Common
law rules of contract, property, and tort sufficed to regulate the field and
would do so again if we could ever repeal the NLRA and eliminate the needless
(and usually partisan) NLRB.
Where common law might not suffice
(arguably that’s the case with respect to pollution, e.g.), Congress
could and should take enough time to write the exact laws that need to be enforced.
Instead of deferring to supposed experts in agencies, who
are not elected (and often act in cahoots with lobbyists from special interest
groups), Congress should listen to debate among actual experts, then draft bills
open for public comment and debate the matter further before voting.
That
would be infinitely better than enacting vague laws to be mostly filled out by
functionaries in the bureaucracy.
It is probably too much to hope that
the Supreme Court would reverse its almost 80 years of abject deference toward
the delegation of legislative power to governmental entities, but not to hope
that it will at least pull the plug on delegation to non-governmental
bodies. That is the issue in a case the Court will hear in December, Department
of Transportation v. Association of American Railroads.
Under the Passenger Rail Improvement
and Investment Act of 2008, Congress gave Amtrak, a for-profit,
quasi-public hybrid, a hand in writing regulations that will apply to its
competitors. That’s an appalling idea.
In this Cato@Liberty
post, attorney Ilya Shapiro explains what is at stake: “Many
agencies are already dominated by the private interests they’re supposed to
regulate (a dynamic known as ‘regulatory capture’), but allowing a private
entity to secure a legislative role in governing its competitors not only
exacerbates the problems that the administrative state already poses, it makes
a mockery of the Constitution and erodes one more important structural
protection for liberty.”
Absolutely right. While rule by
federal bureaucrats appeals to the statist instincts of our “progressives”
(exemplified by the book Philip Dru,
Administrator by Woodrow Wilson’s top adviser, Colonel Edwin
House), it is neither desirable nor permissible under the Constitution.
Rolling back our vast, often wasteful
and authoritarian administrative state is a journey of a thousand miles, but if
the Court stands firm against delegation in this case, at least we will have
taken the first step.
Article originally published on Forbes.com.
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